Abstract This paper studies the role of the markup of price over marginal cost for the transmission of …scal policy shocks. We construct time series of markups allowing for ‡uctuations in capacity utilization and total factor productivity and use an aggregate production function that is more general than Cobb-Douglas. Including the constructed markup series in a panel vector autoregression with annual OECD data, we …nd that a positive shock to government spending substantially lowers markups while raising output, consumption, real interest rates, and government debt. The positive output response appears to result mainly from the positive reaction of capital utilization rather than from the one of hours worked.
Introduction
This paper empirically studies the role of the markup of price over marginal cost in the macroeconomic transmission of shocks to real government spending for a panel of OECD countries. Current macroeconomic policy debates have brought the question of the empirical e¤ects of government spending to the forefront of attention. One aspect is the recent debate about the existence and size of the …scal multiplier on private spending (e.g. Barro and Redlick, 2009, Hall, 2009) , which is of obvious importance for the question whether a …scal stimulus is e¤ective in moving the economy out of recession. A large literature starting with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) has attempted to estimate the e¤ects of shocks to government spending on output and other variables from identi…ed vector autoregressions (see Perotti, 2007 for a survey). Apart from the size of the …scal output multiplier, the impact of …scal shocks on other variables has received considerable attention, in particular private consumption, real interest rates and real wages, since the responses of these variables may shed light on the empirical relevance of di¤erent theories of …scal policy transmission.
Recent studies have investigated the precise nature of the empirical transmission mechanism of government spending shocks. In particular, several authors have pointed at the importance of the markup of price over marginal cost for understanding the e¤ects of …scal shocks. Hall (2009) argues that Keynesian features of …scal policy transmission, i.e. a large positive output multiplier and positive responses of private consumption and real wages to increased government spending, rely on a negative relation of the markup of price over marginal cost to the level of activity. The intuition is that only when the price-marginal cost markup decreases in reaction to higher government spending, the resulting increase in labor supply can materialize without a strong reduction in the real wage, or even with a moderate real wage increase. Therefore, with a markup that is countercyclical conditional on government spending shocks, there can be sizeable output multipliers of …scal spending that need not be accompanied by strong decreases in real wages or consumption, much as the empirical evidence suggests. The same point is made by Bilbiie (2009) .
In general, a countercyclical markup ratio is a feature of New Keynesian models with sticky prices, but could also be implied by models with ‡exible prices when the desired markup changes in response to a shock. A model which assigns a central role to markups for …scal policy transmission has been presented by Ravn et al. (2007) . In their setup, the deep habits property of demand implies that a shock that leads to a positive output response increases the importance of the non-price elastic component of demand, such that the overall demand elasticity rises and the optimal markup desired by …rms declines. Ravn 1 et al. (2007) show that their model can explain empirically observed transmission e¤ects of …scal shocks if the markup that is implied by their estimated model declines su¢ ciently. However, they also note that 'a natural question is whether in the data markups of prices over marginal cost indeed fall in response to a positive innovation in government spending, as required for our theoretical model to capture the observed increase in consumption and real depreciation of the exchange rate. To our knowledge, there is no available SVAR evidence documenting the response of markups to government spending shocks' (Ravn et al., 2007, p. 23 ; our emphasis).
Such direct evidence has since been presented by Monacelli and Perotti (2008) , but only for the US and, more importantly, based on the assumption that production is CobbDouglas and that there is no endogenous cyclical utilization of production factors, such that the markup is directly observable from the inverse of labor's share in output. This is similar to the construction of real marginal costs (the inverse of the markup) in Gali and Gertler (1999) . Monacelli and Perotti (2008) …nd that in a VAR on aggregate US data their markup measure -i.e. the inverse of the labor share -indeed declines following a …scal spending shock.
The central contribution of the present paper is that we construct direct measures of the price marginal cost markups that do not rely on the Cobb-Douglas assumption and allow for variable capacity utilization. We use …rst order conditions from a standard optimizing business cycle model to construct time series of markup measures and include them as variables in a panel VAR model estimated using annual data for 19 OECD countries ranging from 1970 to 2008. Generalizing the production function seems important, as there is empirical evidence that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is typically lower than one (see e.g. Antras, 2004 , who presents evidence for the US, or Chirinko, 2008) . While allowing for a more general production technology is an obvious advantage, the downside is that if production is not Cobb-Douglas the identi…cation of the markup ratio requires an estimate of the technology process. In principle, this could be achieved using a measure of total factor productivity (the Solow residual). However, the standard Solow residual is known to be biased in the case of monopolistic competition (Hall, 1991) and contaminated by unobserved ‡uctuations in the degree of capacity utilization. Increased utilization could erroneously be taken for an increase in total factor productivity due to improved technology, and thus for an increase in the markup. One therefore has to control for unobservable utilization.
To address this issue, we construct empirical measures jointly identifying the time series of the markup, capacity utilization, and total factor productivity. The method is similar to Woodford (1991, 1999) and Basu et al. (2006) , but while the latter authors use regression techniques to estimate a constant markup ratio, we follow the former and use a calibration procedure that delivers the whole time series of the markup. Our approach for controlling for utilization changes and their e¤ect on measured technology change and the markup is similar to Imbs (1999) in that we use the …rst order conditions of a standard model in which the utilization of capital is a choice variable, as in Greenwood et al. (1988) and a large subsequent literature. Other approaches to control for cyclical utilization have been proposed by Basu (1996) by using materials input and by Burnside et al. (1995) by using energy input as a proxy for utilization. Our method provides a theoretically well-founded alternative that does not require access to data on materials and energy use which is rarely available in a cross-country context. The largest part of the previous literature on …scal policy transmission uses data for the US or a small number of additional countries like Canada, the UK, and Australia (see Perotti, 2005 , 2007 , Ravn et al., 2007 , Pappa, 2009 ; an exception is Beetsma et al., 2008, who use annual data to study the international transmission of …scal shocks via trade balances).
The main reason for this choice is data availability, since quarterly time series of su¢ cient length for …scal variables are rarely available. In this paper, we use annual data for OECD countries and estimate the e¤ects of …scal shocks by using panel VAR techniques. Using annual data has an obvious drawback concerning identi…cation. The standard assumption in the …scal VAR literature (e.g. Perotti, 2007) is that government spending can be ordered …rst in a recursive identi…cation. This is plausible with quarterly or higher frequency data, as lags in the planning and implementation of …scal policy decisions can plausibly be assumed to rule out any endogenous reaction of government spending to the state of the business cycle within a quarter (the situation is more complicated when identi…cation of tax shocks is aimed at, which is not the case here). However, with annual data this line of reasoning is arguably less compelling, as …scal policy might well be changed during a year in response to other shocks. Perotti (2007) points out that this may entail a negative bias in the estimated responses of output and private consumption to …scal shocks. In response to an adverse business cycle shock, governments may increase spending within the year to act countercyclically, which would mistakenly be interpreted as an instance of negative output reactions to …scal shocks by a recursive VAR. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether governments typically adjust spending in a countercyclical fashion, such that the direction of the possible bias is hard to predict. More generally, however, Beetsma et al. (2010) argue that the bias in using a recursive VAR with government spending ordered …rst may well be negligible. These authors study the possible identi…cation problem by comparing VARs on annual and quarterly data where both frequencies are available. They …nd that the assumption of a zero response of government spending to output within a year is not rejected by the data. Therefore, they conclude that the recursive identi…cation is a sensible procedure even with annual data. The interpretation is that the budget is set once a year and the variations within the year are comparatively small. Our empirical identi…cation approach uses this argument.
Using annual data has several advantages (beyond data availability). Favero and Giavazzi (2007) argue that …scal VARs are biased as long as the level of debt (in relation to output), which is crucial for the long term …scal sustainability, is not included. However, data on government debt is usually only available over longer samples at annual frequencies. Using annual data allows us to respond to Favero and Giavazzi's (2007) argument by including the debt to output ratio as a variable in our panel VARs.
The main results are as follows. We …nd that markups do tend to decline following a positive …scal spending shock, although to a limited amount. Interestingly, the estimated amount of markup reduction due to government spending shocks is remarkably close to the theoretically implied size of markup reduction that Ravn et al. (2007) have to postulate in order to be able to explain the empirical transmission mechanism of …scal shock within their model of variable markups due to deep habits. We point out that while the estimated markup reaction quantitatively depends on calibrated parameters, the sign of the response is robust for a broad range of parameters that spans virtually all practically relevant parameter sets. In particular, the markup reacts most strongly negatively to a positive government spending shock if the elasticity of substitution between e¤ective capital input and labor in production is close to one, and if utilization does not vary strongly. This is the setting used by Monacelli and Perotti (2008) who assume a Cobb-Douglas production function and neglect changes in capacity utilization. Their work is thus, in the light of our results, likely to overstate the countercyclical markup response to …scal shocks. However, there is still a sizeable and theoretically important estimated markup reduction even in the case of our preferred speci…cation of limited short-run capital-labor substitutability and more highly variable capacity utilization.
We further establish that changes in capacity utilization seem to be a major channel of adjustment following …scal shocks. While the estimated responses of output and private consumption are positive and quantitatively in line with previous studies, we also …nd that the estimated response of hours worked is weak and barely positive. This makes it di¢ cult to explain the sizeable output response through the standard wealth e¤ect on labor supply that is operative in conventional models. The positive output reaction is initially several times stronger than the response of hours, which seems puzzling given decreasing returns to labor. However, we show that variable capacity utilization seems to go a long way toward explaining this apparent contradiction, since utilization reacts strongly positively 4 on impact.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y describes the data set used, with a more detailed discussion deferred to the appendix, and outlines the empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the construction of the markup and utilization series used in the subsequent estimates. Section 4 presents empirical results and section 5 concludes.
Data and econometric approach
We estimate panel VARs using annual data for 19 OECD countries for the period 1970 to 2008. The source of data is mostly the European Commission's AMECO database, while interest rate data are from the IMF's International Financial Statistics and hours worked (which are needed in the markup calculations) are from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre. The data is measured at the aggregate level of each country; the countries included are those OECD members for which the data are available over the whole time span of the sample period; see the appendix for details.
We employ both directly observable and constructed variables. The baseline set of variables consists of real (de ‡ated with the gdp price index) government consumption spending per head of population g t , real gdp per head of population y t , real private consumption expenditures per head of population c t , a real interest rate R t (constructed as the nominal interest rate on long-term government bonds less the rate of change in the gdp de ‡ator), and the government debt-to-output ratio d t (constructed as the general government's consolidated gross debt as a percentage of gdp at market prices). The VARs are identi…ed recursively with government spending ordered …rst. This re ‡ects the common assumption (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, Perotti, 2007) that government spending does not react endogenously to the state of the economy within the period, but only with a lag. While this assumption is rarely debated in the context of VARs using quarterly data, it is less uncontroversial when annual data is used. However, Beetsma et al. (2010) report evidence for cases where both quarterly and annual data are available that the bias entailed by assuming government spending to be exogenous within the year might well be negligible.
Additionally, we use the price marginal cost markup t , and the rate of capacity utilization u t , which are unobservable in principle but can be constructed to follow from optimizing …rst order conditions through a calibration approach based on Woodford (1991, 1999) in a way discussed in detail in the next section. Furthermore, some of the speci…cations also make use of total hours worked h t .
To control for cross-country unobserved heterogeneity, the panel VARs include country …xed e¤ects. Moreover, all estimations discussed in this paper control for time e¤ects. For dynamic panel data models, it is well-known that the simple …xed e¤ects estimator is not consistent for a …nite time dimension, see Nickell (1981) . Since the associated bias decreases in the number of time periods, a practical question is whether the number of time periods available in our study (T = 39) is su¢ ciently large to make the bias neglible.
In Juessen and Linnemann (2010) , we have compared the perfomance of various estimation techniques for panel VARs estimated from macro data. We …nd that, for datasets having similar dimensions as the one used in the present study, the bias of the simple …xed e¤ects estimator can still be substantial (also see Judson and Owen 1998 (2002) estimator.
To make the Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002) estimator suitable for models with higher order VAR dynamics (we use two lags), one can use the fact that any VAR(p) process can be written in VAR(1) form by imposing blockwise zero and identity restrictions on the VAR slope coe¢ cients, see e.g. Lütkepohl (2006, p. 15 and p. 194 ) and also Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002, p. 1640) . We therefore use an extended version of the Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002) estimator that allows for linear constraints. To control for time e¤ects, we use a projection matrix to average the observations over individuals and then use the transformed data in the estimations (which is equivalent to including the matrix of time dummies as regressors). Finally, as in Klaassen (2006, 2008) , we control for linear country-speci…c time trends.
Markup construction
The approach used to construct time series of the price marginal cost markup t and the rate of capital utilization u t is based on Woodford (1991, 1999) . The approach is also similar to Basu et al. (2006) , but the di¤erence is that these authors estimate a constant markup as a regression parameter, while we identify a time series of variable markup ratios based on postulating speci…c values for some structural model parameters. To construct series for the markup, we use a standard optimizing business cycle model with monopolistic competition and endogenous utilization of capital (similar to e.g. Christiano et al., 2005 , or Justiniano et al., 2009 . Note that only the static intratemporal …rst order conditions of the model are needed for the procedure to construct markups and utilization rates. This is clearly an advantage, since the most controversial aspects of macroeconomic models pertain to the intertemporal optimality conditions, like consumption Euler equations. These are not needed here at all, such that the proposed empirical strategy would be valid not only in the speci…c simple model used here, but also in a wider class of models which might di¤er greatly with respect to their predictions concerning dynamics. Note that we also do not make use of optimizing conditions with respect to labor supply, which are also highly controversial; our method should thus be robustly valid in many labor market models.
Households have a concave period utility function v(c t ; n t ), where c t is private consumption and n t is labor supply (hours), and maximize
subject to the ‡ow budget constraint
where w t and r t are the real wage and capital rental rates, respectively, k t is the capital stock, t is residual …rm pro…ts, and i t is investment. The variable u t > 0 is the endogenous degree of utilization of capital and the function a(u t ) determines the resource costs of utilization per unit of capital (a speci…cation widely used in the literature, e.g. Christiano et al. 2005 , Justiniano et al. 2009 ). It is assumed that
Here, = 00 u= 0 measures the costliness of varying utilization; it is thus an inverse index of the variability of utilization in equilibrium. The capital accumulation constraint is given by
where 2 (0; 1) is the constant depreciation rate. 1 1 We also experimented with a more general version where labor e¤ort is variable and total labor input nt is decomposed as nt = mthtet with mt employment, ht per capita hours, and et labor e¤ort. As in Basu et al. (2006) , then, under certain conditions labor e¤ort can be shown (from the household's …rst order conditions) to be uniquely related to per capita hours. The results of these experiments showed that robustly (i.e. for all parameters that govern the relationship between per capita hours and e¤ort that we The household …rst order conditions for n t , c t , and u t are (letting subindices denote partial derivatives)
The …rm sector is characterized by a continuum of …rms indexed on i 2 [0; 1] each producing a variety of the output good and engaged in monopolistic competition. The i-th …rm's demand is assumed to be
where y it is individual output, y t is aggregate output, p it is the relative price of the i-th good in terms of the general price level, and " t > 1 is the possibly time-varying absolute value of the elasticity of demand. The technology is
where F (:) is a production function with the usual neoclassical properties and z t is the level of technology. We assume constant returns to scale of the function F (:) in its two arguments u it k it and n it . The …rm chooses employment n it and utilized capital u it k it to maximize pro…ts, taking aggregate output, technology, and real factor prices as given.
Introducing the markup
we can write the …rst order conditions that describe a symmetric equilibrium (in which each …rm chooses the same factor inputs and charges the same price, such that the individual …rm index can be dropped) as
where
Now consider the equilibrium conditions (3), where we can substitute out the di¢ cult tried) the response of per capita hours to government spending shocks is rather ‡at. This also implies that labor e¤ort does not contribute signi…cantly to the responses. We therefore proceed with the simpler version where labor input is measured in terms of hours and there is no variable e¤ort.
8 to observe rental rate of capital through (6), (5), and the symmetric version of (4) which reads y t = z t F (u t k t ; n t ). These are three equations in the eight endogenous variables k t ; u t ; t ; n t ; y t ; w t ; z t . Our strategy is to treat n t ; k t ; y t ; w t as observable variables and to use data on these as well as the information embodied in the aforementioned equilibrium conditions to empirically determine implied time paths of the unobservable variables t ; z t ; u t . We do so via a log-linear approximation along a balanced growth path; the appendix gives the details of the calculations. Denote for any variable x t its constant value on the balanced growth path by a variable without time subscript, x, and the log-deviation as
The log-deviations of the markup, utilization, and technology can then be recovered as (see appendix)
where s K and s L are the shares of capital and labor along the balanced growth path and is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the production function.
For the empirical work, we thus need b y t ; b n t ; b k t ; b w t , which we calculate as log-deviations from deterministic linear trends (using quadratic time trends did not change the results much). Further, we need a choice of constants for the steady state parameters ; ; ; and s L (whence s K = (1 s L ) = follows from constant returns to scale). This enables us to …nd the time path of the deviations b u t ; b t ; b z t from which the levels can be recovered, e.g. t = exp(b t ) , once constant steady state levels for u; ; z are given. We apply this procedure for each country in the data set separately, such that we get time series t ; u t ; z t for each individual country. Since information on empirically realistic calibration values for the constant parameters is scarce for countries other than the US, we choose the same parameter set for all countries. For the average markup , we use the value 1:2 which is commonly used in the business cycle literature based on results by Basu and Fernald (1996) for the US. The labor income share is set to the customary value s L = 2=3. The crucial parameters that remain are the elasticity of capital-labor substitution and the elasticity of the depreciation cost with respect to utilization . In most studies, such as Monacelli and Perotti (2008) or Basu et al. (2006) , a Cobb-Douglas assumption implicitly restricts to one. One of the main advantages of the procedure followed here is that we can relax this restrictive assumption. Antras (2004) …nds that, for the US, the typical elasticity of capital-labor substitution lies between 0.6 and 0.9, while a part of his various estimates suggest that it could even be well below 0.5. Chirinko (2008) surveys the literature estimating the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor and concludes that the elasticity is in the range of 0.4 to 0.6 and that, consequently, 'there is little evidence to sustain the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function'. We thus choose = 0:5 as our benchmark value and report the sensitivity of the estimates when the markup series is constructed using other values for .
The parameter is even more di¢ cult to pin down empirically. Note that in the limit if gets large, the model collapses to one without a utilization margin, whereas a low value of implies low costs of varying capital utilization, such that measured utilization would be highly variable over the business cycle. The latter is indeed found by studies which estimate this parameter in the context of full scale empirical DSGE models, e.g. set. Note that while the level of the average markup is imposed a priori, the ‡uctuations visible in the …gures are not. As a preliminary step, we can thus use our estimates to comment on the long standing question whether markups are (unconditionally) countercyclical over the business cycle (see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992 , Hall, 2009 ). In our sample, the median correlation of the markup series with linearly detrended output is 0:28; in 7 out of the 19 country cases we …nd a weakly procyclical behavior of the markup. The countercyclicality of the markup becomes somewhat weaker if we choose the scenario of high variability in capital utilization ( = 0:01), where the median correlation between the markup and detrended output drops to 0:21: In the case of low variability in capital utilization ( = 10) the median correlation is 0:27. Thus, we conclude that some modestly countercyclical markup behavior seems to be present in our sample.
However, the question whether the markup is unconditionally countercyclical is arguably less important in our context than its conditional correlation with output in response to …scal shocks. Thus, in the next section, we proceed by using the markup series as variables in a …scal VAR to shed light on the conditional variation in markups in the presence of government spending shocks, and thus on their role in the transmission mechanism of …scal policy.
Results

Baseline panel VAR
The baseline panel VAR consists of real per capita government spending g t , real per capita gdp y t , real per capita private consumption c t , the markup series constructed above t , the ex-post real interest rate (de ‡ated with the gdp price index log-change) on long-term government bonds R t , and the ratio of government debt to gdp d t ; more detailed data de…nitions can be found in the appendix. As the construction of the markup ratio uses a loglinearization procedure, we allow for country-speci…c di¤erences in the balanced growth paths by entering the variables in the form of log-deviations from linear trends (though it should be noted that all results reported below are robust to using the log-levels of the variables). Throughout, we set up the panel VARs with two lags of each endogenous variable, and include country …xed e¤ects as well as a matrix of time dummy variables.
Note that alternatively using either only one lag, or three lags, of the endogenous variables did not change the results by much. Identi…cation relies on ordering government spending …rst for the Cholesky decomposition that delivers the structural …scal policy shock, as customary in the the empirical literature (e.g. Perotti, 2007) ; see the introduction for a discussion of this standard approach in the current context. Figure 1 shows impulse responses to a one percent shock to government spending in the baseline panel VAR (with 90% bootstrapped con…dence bands). The panel VAR is estimated using the bias-corrected …xed e¤ects estimator developed by Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002) . For the sake of completeness, appendix A.4 presents the corresponding results obtained using the standard …xed e¤ects estimator. This estimator is known to have a negative bias (see Juessen and Linnemann, 2010) . In the present context, the impulse responses from simple …xed e¤ects estimates are still reasonably close to the bias-corrected ones, but the responses are more short-lived than under bias correction.
The …gure shows that …scal shocks tend to raise government spending rather persistently, as commonly found in the literature. There is a signi…cantly positive impact response of real gdp and a slightly weaker positive reaction of private consumption. Again, this result is to be expected from previous studies. The size of the '…scal multplier' on output is similar to what has been reported elsewhere: the impact e¤ect of a one percent shock to government spending is to raise gdp by about 0:11 percent, which -evaluated The debt to output ratio increases strongly and very persistently following a surge in government spending. This can be viewed as saying that government spending is typically de…cit …nanced in the short run. However, over time the budget is adjusted in order to keep the build-up of debt under control, such that the debt to output ratio shows some mean reversion over the longer run. Note that Favero and Giavazzi (2007) argue that …scal VARs are biased if no measure of debt is included, since the estimation of the adjustment process should allow for the interactions induced by the presence of the government budget constrained. Thus, including debt to output ratios can be seen as a way to avoid these problems (though leaving out the debt ratio does not change any of the other results fundamentally).
Moreover, …gure 1 shows a marked but short-lived increase in the real bond interest rate. This is in contrast to some of the previous literature, which typically …nds weak reactions of interest rates to …scal shocks (e.g. Corsetti and Müller, 2006) . The reason could be due to di¤erences in the empirical measures of interest rates used and in the extended country sample analyzed here. If we include the nominal government bond interest rate and the gdp in ‡ation rate separately in the VAR (instead of using a real interest rate measure), we get an almost ‡at response of the nominal interest rate and a decrease in in ‡ation in response to a government spending shock. However, the responses of the other variables are not much a¤ected by the choice of the interest rate measure, such that these empirical choices do not turn out to be crucial for the results that are the center of the focus here.
Most importantly, namely, we …nd that a positive shock to government spending leads to a signi…cant reduction in the markup t . The impact response is 0:27, though the e¤ect dies out fairly rapidly and markups return to normal within a few years. This central result has turned out to be robust to all variations that we investigated, like modest changes in the sample size, the number of countries covered, the choice of variables entering the panel VAR, and adding or deleting lags. Further robustness checks with respect to the postulated parameter values used to construct the markup series are presented in the following subsection. We are thus con…dent that …scal expansions indeed tend to reduce price marginal cost markups.
This result is interesting in the light of recent debates surrounding the precise nature of the transmission process of government spending shocks. Hall (2009) argues that substantial output multipliers of government shocks can only be explained through countercyclical markup behavior. The reason is that with a constant markup, the additional labor input set forth by higher government spending through the usual wealth e¤ect reduces the real wage due to decreasing returns to labor. This limits the amount of the equilibrium increase in labor. As a consequence, the output multiplier will be small, and likely too small to allow for an increase in consumption. If, on the other hand, the markup of price over marginal cost declines when a positive …scal shock occurs, …rms are willing to hire more labor at any given real wage rate, since the economy has e¤ectively become more competitive. The resulting boost to labor demand limits the real wage decrease, or even allows for an increase in real wages, which may also give room to a positive response of consumption.
This theoretical argument is supported by the estimates presented in …gure 1, which brings direct evidence that this line of reasoning seems to be consistent with empirical 13 observations. Moreover, the substantial markup decline is well in line with the theoretical implications derived from the model of variable markups presented by Ravn et al. (2007) .
In their model, there is a non-price elastic component of goods demand, since consumers have consumption habits with respect to individual goods. An exogenous surge in …scal spending then increases the relative importance of the price elastic component of demand, such that the overall price elasticity of demand rises and the markup declines. Ravn et al. (2007) estimate the parameters of their model by matching the theoretical impulse responses of their model to the empirical ones obtained from a four country panel VAR using government spending, output, consumption, the trade balance, and the real exchange rate as variables. They then show that their model, when evaluated using the estimated parameter values, implies that the markup ratio -which they treat as unobservablemust decrease in response to a positive government shock. More speci…cally, they state that "in response to a one-percent increase in domestic government spending, markups in domestic markets fall by 26 basis points on impact" (p.21). Note that this theoretical implication of their model is very close to the empirical …nding we present here. Our results thus can be seen as providing independent evidence for their view of the …scal transmission mechanism, since the theoretically implied markup behavior of their model is empirically supported by our direct estimates of the markup ratios. Of course, this does not rule out that other theories that rely on countercyclical markup behavior in response to government shocks might be the root of the empirical results presented here.
Robustness of the markup response
Our …nding that markups are conditionally countercyclical in response to government spending shocks depends, of course, on the validity of the procedure used to construct the unobservable markup series. In particular, we have postulated values for the elasticities that explain how the empirical markup measure follows from the observable time series on output, employment, capital, and real wages. Some of these parameters are controversial.
In particular, the cost elasticity of the utilization rate is neither easy to pin down empirically, nor is there a standard calibration value used in the literature. Therefore, in this section we assess the robustness of the results with respect to di¤erent assumptions concerning parameters. In the next subsection, we analyze the behavior of the implied utilization rate series u t itself. Figure 2 shows that the size of the initial markup response to a …scal shock depends on the assumptions concerning the variability of capacity utilization. In particular, postulating a low elasticity -implying low costs to varying utilization and therefore more volatile utilization-leads one to conclude a more muted markup response (see the dashed lines in . However, for all of these speci…cations, the markup response remains strongly negative, such that none of the qualitative conclusions depends on one's particular prior with respect to the parameter . Models that do not take into account the variability of the utilization rate, like Monacelli and Perotti (2008) , are therefore likely to overstate the amount to which the markup declines in response to a …scal shock.
Next, …gure 3 shows the markup response to a …scal shock for di¤erent values of the elasticity of substitution (keeping equal to its baseline value of one). For an elasticity of substitution closer to the Cobb-Douglas case of one (see the dotted line in the …gure drawn for = 0:85) the markup response is more strongly negative. However, qualitatively, the result of a markedly negative response is unaltered even for the more realistic (in the short run) speci…cation of a lower elasticity of substitution. Overall, these results suggest that a countercyclical markup response does not seem to be a …gment of speci…c parameter choices, but appears to be a robust feature of the data for a wide range of plausible parameters.
Utilization and hours
Until now, we have concentrated on the markup response to …scal shocks. However, while we argue that the markup is an important element in understanding the …scal transmission process due to its impact on labor demand, it is also worthwhile to consider the supply Figure 4 shows the responses of these variables to a one percent shock to government spending, using the baseline parameterization for the construction of the utilization rate series.
As can be seen in the left panel of …gure 4, hours worked respond weakly and only initially positive (although neither the initial positive nor the later negative response is signi…cant at the 90% con…dence level). This result is somewhat surprising, at …rst sight because, as shown before and in a large previous literature, the output response is markedly positive. This raises the question how the additional output that follows a …scal expansion is actually produced, given that capital is predetermined in the short run and labor input responds so weakly. Put di¤erently, …scal shocks seem to have a strongly positive short-run e¤ect on labor productivity. used. Note that while an hours response that is weaker than the output response is a typical …nding in the earlier literature, this aspect of the e¤ect of …scal shocks has not been discussed much so far. Our …nding thus suggests that cyclical capacity utilization is an important element in the …scal transmission process.
Arguably, this also casts a di¤erent light on the discussion of the size of the government output multiplier from the point of view of stabilization policy. If countercyclical government spending is to be used to stabilize the economy, the e¤ect on employment might well be negligible even if the output multiplier is substantial, since most of the output e¤ect seems to come from increases in utilization.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to present direct evidence for the behavior of markups of price over marginal cost in response to government spending shocks. The reaction of the markup is important from a theoretical point of view, as several authors have argued that the available empirical evidence on the transmission of …scal shocks can only be understood if the markup responds negatively to an increase in …scal spending. It is thus natural to look for direct empirical evidence on markup changes following …scal expansions.
Since the markup is not directly observable, the main empirical problem is to distinguish between changes in the markup and changes in the marginal product of labor due to cyclical ‡uctuations in the rate of unobservable capacity utilization rates and technical progress. This paper has used a method to jointly recover empirical measures for all three of these quantities from the loglinearized versions of optimizing …rst order conditions from a standard business cycle model with endogenous utilization and monopolistic competition.
We have applied this methodology to a panel VAR with annual OECD country data and found that there is a strong and signi…cant reduction in the markup ratio in response to an increase in government spending. The conditionally countercyclical markup response is qualitatively robust to variations in crucial parametric assumptions. This result lends empirical credibility to countercyclical markup theories of …scal transmission. Furthermore, we also found that the response of hours worked to a government spending shock is surprisingly weak and hardly signi…cant, if at all positive. While this casts doubt on the standard view of …scal transmission, which explains a sizeably positive output response to higher public spending through the positive reaction of labor input, we suggest that the missing link appears to be a strongly positive reaction of capital utilization. Thus, a theoretical explanation of the transmission of shocks to government spending should account for the simultaneous negative reaction of markups and the positive reaction of factor utilization rates. The development of such a theoretical model that to our knowledge does not currently exist seems to be a fruitful …eld for further research. R t : Real interest rate: Long term government bond yields (IMF, International Financial Statistics, except for Finland and Spain. For these countries, the IMF data are missing and the long term interest rate from the OECD Main Economic Indicators was used instead), less growth rate of price de ‡ator of gdp (AMECO).
For the construction of markups and utilization rates, we need data on real wages, hours worked, and the capital stock (and output y t ):
w t : Real wage rate: Compensation of employees (AMECO), divided by the price de ‡ator of gdp (AMECO), divided by total annual hours worked (GGDC). 
A.2 Construction of markup, utilization, and technology series
The relevant theoretical restrictions are (3), the aggregate version of (4), as well as (5) and (6). These equations are repeated here for convenience:
y t = z t F (u t k t ; n t );
z t F 2 (u t k t ; n t ) = t w t ; (10) z t F 1 (u t k t ; n t ) = t r t :
These are 4 equations in the 8 variables r t ; k t ; u t ; t ; n t ; y t ; w t ; z t . If we treat n t ; k t ; y t ; w t as observable and replace r t by (8) in (11), we can use these equations to empirically 22 identify the unobservables u t ; t ; z t . We do so via a log-linear approximation. Following the method of Woodford (1991, 1999) , loglinearizing along a balanced growth path yields: (everything that does not carry a time index is a constant evaluated at the balanced growth path):
Note that
From constant returns to scale in production we have for the elasticities F 12 n = F 11 uk;
F 12 uk = F 22 n; such that
Further note that constant returns implies for the elasticity of substitution :
Therefore, the elasticities needed above are
F 12 uk F 2 = 1 F 1 uk F :
23
Further, we know that
where s L and s K are the constant shares of labor and capital income in production along the balanced growth path, respectively.
Thus, we …nally have
Writing the above in matrix form and substituting out b
which is equation (7) in the main text.
Thus, given a vector of the period t observations on b y t ; b n t ; b k t ; b w t , we can infer the period t values of the unobservables b u t ; b t ; b z t if we choose values for the steady state elasticities: ; ; ; s L , and s K = (1 s L ) = . For the empirical work, we interpret the hatted observable variables b y t ; b n t ; b k t ; b w t as log-deviations from deterministic time trends, such that for any variable b x t = ln(x t =x). The levels of the variables can be recovered as Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002) .
